Abstract-Methods to generate private keys based on wireless channel characteristics have been proposed as an alternative to standard key-management schemes. In this paper, we discuss past work in the field and offer a generalized scheme for the generation of private keys using uncorrelated channels in multiple domains. Proposed cognitive enhancements measure channel characteristics, to dynamically change transmission and reception parameters as well as estimate private key randomness and expiration time. We evaluate a proof-of-concept implementation of this system with and without interferers in software using a channel model that provides variation in multiple domains.
I. INTRODUCTION
For a wireless communications link to be secure, it must provide data confidentiality and integrity during transmission. The principal method through which this is achieved is the use of cryptography, of which there are generally two types, public key [1] and private key [2] .
Public-key cryptography is a method for secret communication between two parties without the requirement of an initial exchange of secret keys. It employs a pair of keys, one private, which is held secret, and one public, which is distributed. Messages are encrypted with the recipient's public key and decrypted with the recipient's corresponding private key. Public-key cryptography is thus relatively unencumbered with key-exchange difficulties and key-interception vulnerabilities, however it is computationally intensive.
Private-key cryptography is a method for secret communication between two parties that requires an initial exchange of a single shared secret key. Messages are encrypted by the sender and decrypted by the recipient using this same shared key. Private-key cryptography is less computationally intensive than public-key cryptography, however key distribution and management are problematic. Key distribution risks that the secret key will be intercepted during transmission. Key management requires the generation and transport of a different key for each communicating party [3] .
Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. SAND2009-1716C approved for unlimited public release.
Despite differing characteristics, both methods of cryptography require some form of key-distribution infrastructure responsible for either authenticating public keys or securely distributing private keys. Because in some deployment scenarios such an infrastructure can be cost prohibitive or logistically impossible, several alternative methods of managing cryptographic keying variables have been proposed, one of which utilizes the communications channel as a keying variable [4] . This solution eliminates the need for a key-distribution infrastructure, in that private keys are generated during communications, using shared physical information between two nodes.
In this paper, we discuss the properties of wireless channels that enable this technology, prior work on the use of a channel as keying variable, and present a generalized scheme for the generation of private keys using uncorrelated channels in multiple domains. We follow with a proof-of-concept demonstration of the generalized scheme using a ray-tracing channel model that provides variation in multiple domains, basic channel cognition to optimize performance, and estimations of encryption key strength. Finally, we conclude with a demonstration of how cognitive radios can respond to narrowand broad-band interference from primary users occupying a channel.
II. CHANNEL CHARACTERISTICS
Stated simply, a communications channel is the medium between a transmitter and receiver. Information is conveyed over this channel by varying a metric, such as voltage or phase, over a domain, such as space, time, frequency, or polarization. For example, AM radio is broadcast in free space (medium), and carries its information on a carrier that varies in amplitude (metric) over time (domain) .
If a channel is passive and isotropic (linear), it possesses the property of being reciprocal [5] . Specifically applied to wireless systems, if two antennas transmit an identical signal, then the received signals will also be identical [6] , [7] . It is this quality of reciprocity which is exploited to generate the shared information used to create a private key. It is also required that the communication channel be uncorrelated with the channel of an eavesdropper and sufficiently complex that the time required to deduce the channel characteristics are on the order of the time necessary to do a brute-force search for the cryptovariable. For a static channel, the lifetime and strength of the cryptovariable is thus related to the complexity of the channel. Channels which vary in a metric over a domain (such as power over time), provide a source of entropy from which keys can be derived continuously. Provided the generation rate is in excess of the time necessary to do a brute-force search of the cryptovariable, the only requirement on the system is that an eavesdropper not share a correlated channel. This suggests that wireless transmissions have great potential for the generation of private keys from reciprocal transmissions.
III. RELATED WORK
Using a reciprocal channel as a source of shared information to generate private keys has been demonstrated in a variety of systems that measure different metrics over various domains. In [4] and [8] the authors propose a system where each radio transmits two or more unmodulated carriers at orthogonal frequencies and the phase differences between the observed carriers are used as the source of common information. In [9] , the polarity of carrier envelope samples of a narrowband signal is used to generate a private key. In [10] , threshold magnitude carrier variations in time and frequency are measured. In [11] and [12] , threshold magnitude-only signal-strength variation is measured in time with pseudorandom variation added via switched parasitic antenna elements [13] , [17] . In [14] , an ultra-wideband pulse is used to measure the channel impulse response in time. In [15] , the authors present a MIMO system with two antennas per node which generates bits for a keying variable based on which antenna receives the stronger signal. In [16] , threshold detection of deep fades in signal strength is measured in time.
All systems exploit reciprocity to generate a private key. All systems generate keys in time, with two systems also using frequency or space. All systems measure a single metric, with most using carrier magnitude. All systems employ a binary constellation (two-state threshold or differential) to convert measured metrics into key bits. All systems have a constant sample period or bandwidth. Two systems provide pseudorandom variation of static channels. A summary of measurement and variation metrics and their corresponding domains for each system is shown in Table I. IV. GENERALIZED SCHEME A generalized scheme for a system that uses the channel as a keying variable assumes that a pair of nodes are capable of accessing all channels in all domains without limit. For example, such a system would have the ability to measure polarization over a complete sphere, vector signal strength over all of frequency, or relative phase between any two points in space. In actuality, a realized system will be limited by the capabilities of its hardware and thus its ability to respond to and extract data from the channel. However, a general analysis is useful as a means to better understand how a cognitive radio can access, measure, and exploit multiple metrics in multiple domains to generate private cryptographic keys.
An activity diagram of a generalized system is shown in Figure 1 . System activity can be broken down into four principal steps. In step (a), a signal, s, is transmitted across one or more uncorrelated channels. Channel complexity and variation modulate this signal and upon reception several metrics over several domains are measured as the signal, r. In step (b), these metrics are scaled and converted to one or more multidimensional weights, w n . It is at this step that the channels are characterized, the result of which are fed to the preceding and following steps to change the transmission and reception parameters. In step (c), weights are converted to key symbols, k n , using a key-generation function or constellation. In step (d), the final key is corrected, hashed, h, and verified. The following sections discuss the measurement of metrics over a domain, the channel characterization for system feedback, the keying functions used to convert weights to key symbols, and the correction, hashing, and comparison of keys.
A. Channel Variability
Wireless signals exchanged by a pair of nodes simultaneously over a reciprocal channel will experience identical multipath fading. This fading is in essence a modulation of the carrier that conveys information about the physical state of the channel. Upon reception, this information can be extracted by measuring channel metrics over domains absolutely or differentially. For instance, in a given channel one can measure the variation of carrier magnitude (metric) over time (domain) or relative carrier phase (metric) between many antennas over space (domain). In essence, the received carrier is demodulated by the system and the resulting information is used to create a shared cryptographic key. The amount of information that a system can extract from the environment is a function of the channel's complexity and the number uncorrelated channels that a radio can access.
In previously published work, time is the primary domain over which channel metrics are measured to generate keys. Although two systems pair time with an additional domain, it is entirely possible to exclude time altogether to generate one or more keys in a single time step. Additionally, the system can monitor the state of many channels in multiple domains to select uncorrelated varying channels. For carrier amplitude fading, this variability can be quantified in time, frequency, or space by measuring the coherence time, coherence bandwidth, or coherence length [18] .
There is a well understood relationship between the size of a cryptovariable and the resources required to perform a brute-force search for it. Despite this, a system which uses the environment as a keying variable must set a key expiration time that is at most the time required to do a brute-force key search or at least the time required to solve for the channel. In short, a simple environment generates weak keys and a well implemented system must take this into consideration. Indeed, even a generalized system with access to all domains without limit, suffers from degenerate environments, such as free space, where channels provide no information (complexity or variation) for key generation.
One solution to this problem is independent reciprocal pseudorandom variation of the channel by individual nodes. That is, each node without knowledge of the state of the other node can introduce pseudorandom reciprocal variations in the carrier of transmitted signal over any domain. Such a capability has been demonstrated in a system that varies antenna gain over time [11] , [12] . Note that the variations must be independent as it is a tenet in cryptography that an adversary is presumed to be in possession of the encryption algorithm and that security rests solely on the secret key. Thus it is not sufficient for two nodes to reorder data using a shared function, such as interleaving [11] , [12] , as this algorithm is considered to be known. A summary of pseudorandom metric variations over domains is shown in Table I .
B. Measurement and Cognition
After transmission through and modulation by the channel, a signal is measured as metrics over domains. These metrics are then conditioned through optional linearization or normalization and stored a weights. These weights serve as inputs into a key-generation function or constellation to produce key symbols.
Because the strength of the private key is a direct function of the complexity and variability of the communication channels, the radio which uses the channel as a keying variable must be aware of the state of the channel at all times. Principally, this state information provides a method to estimate the strength of the generated keys and their expected expiration times. Secondarily, the state of the channel can be fed backwards into the preceding components to dynamically change sampling and forward into the following components to modify constellations. Such adaptive features, however, require communication and agreement between both nodes and is considered a method to improve data extraction as opposed to increasing key strength. In all previously demonstrated systems, the domain sample sizes (sampling rate or bandwidth) is constant. Systems instead attempt to correct errors due to slowly or rapidly varying channels by skipping or interleaving redundant data and error-correction algorithms respectively.
C. Constellations
A key-generation function or constellation is a mechanism that converts measured weights into key symbols using constellation points or regions. Key symbols represent one or more bits which are combined to form a complete key. In the generalized scheme, a constellation space has one or more dimensions and is addressed with a vector comprised of one or more weights. All previously demonstrated systems convert a single metric directly to a single key bit by using a magnitude-or polaritythreshold keying function. While constellations are not discussed, these magnitude-threshold functions are equivalent to a one-dimensional constellation with two binary symbols, as shown in Figure 2a and 2b. The system demonstrated in [10] extends this paradigm to fourteen parallel one-dimensional binary-threshold functions, equivalent to the constellation shown in Figure 2c . Alternately, with the measure of multiple independent metrics, it is possible to instead utilize a single multidimensional constellation, an example thereof is shown in Figure 2d .
With either a function or constellation, it is important to normalize and linearize a metric such that the probability of a weight appearing in each region is equal. In previously published work, metrics with nonlinear distributions and a static threshold yield key bits that are not equally distributed [16] . It is to emphasize the importance of conditioning that metrics and weights are defined separately. A metric refers to the value as measured, whereas a weight is a normalized and linearized value for use in a keying function or constellation such that it provides equal probability of returning any symbol.
Even with a perfectly reciprocal channel, differences in weight values will exist between nodes due to domain synchronization errors, such as synchronization in time, clock drift in phase, or oscillator drift in frequency. If a domain synchronization error exists, an error bounds can be defined around a weight whose size is a function of the rate of the met- ric variation over the domain, as seen in Figure 3a . To reduce errors a system can analyze a channel and change the sampling rate or reduce the constellation complexity to compensate for the increased error bounds. Previously demonstrated systems maintained constant sample rates and employed static keying functions, instead relying on error-correction postprocessing.
There can also exist a dependence of error bounds between dimensions of a single weight. Specifically, in a twodimensional vector-magnitude constellation, because phase changes slowly at amplitude peaks and rapidly at amplitude nulls in a time-varying channel, error bounds in phase are a function of amplitude (Figure 3a) . While most implemented systems ignore phase, an alternative is to define a constellation which excludes phase information for low amplitudes and includes phase information for high amplitudes as shown in Figure 3b .
D. Key Correction and Expiration
After generation, one or more keys are corrected and compared between nodes while maintaining key secrecy. Previously published systems utilize both well-understood algebraic decoding methods [19] and more novel methods such as fuzzy information reconciliators [16] . For the algebraic decoding method, keys are padded with known data and a syndrome is generated and exchanged between nodes. Depending on the algorithm and the syndrome size, such a scheme allows for the correction of several erroneous bits in a key. After correction, final agreement of the keys is checked by comparing a oneway hash of the private keys [20] .
One of the more important contributions a cognitive system can provide to a key-generation system is an estimate of key strength and thus expiration time. Although an adversary's knowledge of the environment, including locations of eavesdroppers, cannot be known, it is possible to measure metric variations over each domain. This metric variation can be quantified as a domain coherence, such as coherence time or coherence bandwidth for amplitude fading. This measure is used to estimate the key strength and set expiration times. The exact relationship between these metrics and key expiration time is dependent on the implementation of each system. Although it is discussed in a preceding section that a system can generate keys in domains other than time, ultimately it is in the time domain in which keys are solved for by an adversary. Thus even if multiple keys are generated simultaneously in a single time step and used serially, key expiration times are set together. Thus such a system ultimately relies on a timevarying channel to build new keys over the lifetime of its deployment.
It is important to note, that some environments can periodically revert to a degenerate state, such as an office building on a weekend morning. If channel variation between each degenerate state is low, keys generated during these periods are vulnerable, as the time an adversary has to understand the environment is the history of all time that environment has previously been in that state. Thus it can be beneficial to a system to maintain a history of the channel over time to identify periodic degenerative states and avoid the generation of keys during those periods. 
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT
This section presents the results of a simulation which demonstrates several of the topics discussed in the previous section. A physical system is modeled in MATLAB using a two-dimensional ray-tracing code with the topology shown Figure 4 . This simulated system represents communication across and down a street between two buildings. Although only the principal ray is shown, the model includes reflections between the reflectors, up to the convergence point with a maximum of ten reflections. Two nodes, A and B, are separated in the simulation space, with node B having two antennas, B 1 and B 2 , which are placed in close proximity.
The channel is simulated between 2.4 and 2.6 GHz with a 200 MHz or 8 % working bandwidth, a realistic figure for a communications system. The separation between the antennas of node B is 1 m, which at the center frequency of 2.5 GHz is approximately 8.3λ . By means of the channel impulse re- For low carrier amplitudes that correspond to regions of rapid phase change, regions with reduced or no phase divisions are used. The path followed by the weights over frequency (b) demonstrates qualitatively that the channels are uncorrelated.
sponse, the coherence bandwidth of both channels is calculated to be 320 kHz. The frequency step size is dynamically set to approximately eight times this value or 2.5 MHz, yielding a total of 80 frequency points over the bandwidth at which metrics are measured. The magnitude and phase of the received carrier are measured at the sample points and shown in Figure 5 . To be suitable as weights which are combined to form vectors to access symbols in the constellation, the metrics are conditioned. The magnitude of the received signal is normalized and scaled. The phase is unrolled, removing the phase change due to the frequency sweep and is similarly scaled. The conditioned metrics are shown in Figure 6 .
The constellation is shown in Figure 7a . The lowest magnitude threshold is dynamic and set by the median of the conditioned amplitude minus the standard deviation as an approximate boundary between a signal and a null. The remaining amplitude region is divided equally. All amplitude regions have four phase regions with the exception of the first and second which have one and three regions respectively. There are a total of sixteen regions each corresponding to a four-bit symbol.
As stated in previously, the variation of the magnitude and phase over frequency are often correlated, with a null in magnitude corresponding to rapid change in phase. Likewise, amplitude peaks tend to correspond to slow phase variation. Thus, to improve variability over the constellation, the magnitude from channel AB 1 is combined with the phase from channel AB 2 to create the weight w 12 and conversely the weight w 21 . These two weights are utilized simultaneously to generate the private encryption key. However, the weights w 11 and w 22 , which are comprised of the magnitude and phase of channel AB 1 and AB 2 , are still utilized to detect regions of rapid change. In use, the symbols returned by the weights w 12 and w 21 are used, unless the weights w 11 and w 22 return symbol A. Figure 7b shows the path of the vectors over the constellation in frequency, with the location of the sample points marked. There are 80 sample points for each of the two paths through the constellation, generating a total 640 b in a single time step. The symbols, each representing four bits, returned by the simulated channel are as follows:
IJNMMIMM MMMIMMIE IIEEEAAA AAAADDDD DDDDAADD DACCGGGG GKKKJJJA ANAAIIII EEIEEEEE EBBEEBBB JJJJNNNJ JNNNJJNJ JCCCBCCB BBBABBBA ABBAAAAA DDDDDDDD HHHDDDDD DDDDDDDH LHHLLLLL LLKGDDHG It can be seen qualitatively that the the vectors vary over the constellation space randomly and appear uncorrelated. A runs test in MATLAB confirms this, returning a p-value of 0.09. This demonstrates that a random shared key can be generated in a single time step by measuring multiple metrics over the frequency domain.
Because of perfect reciprocity in the channel, there is no bit disagreement between nodes. However, as discussed previously, misalignment of the sample metric between nodes can lead to errors. Simulations show that a 2.5 MHz frequency misalignment between node A and B generates approximately three bit errors, which can easily be corrected using previously discussed error-correction methods.
VI. INTERFERENCE
The ability of an eavesdropper to deduce the shared cryptographic key has been analyzed in several prior works [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [20] , however the effect of an interferer has not yet been considered. In the following section, the effects of a narrow-band FM transmitter and a low-power, broadband jammer on the performance of the key-generation system are discussed. The physical system with the topology shown in Figure 8 is modeled using previously described methodology and parameters. This simulated system represents communication across and down a street between two buildings in the presence of an interferer. Three nodes, A, B, and J, are separated in the simulation space. For simplicity, only antenna B 1 is considered.
One of the primary capabilities of a cognitive radio is the ability to scan a spectral band for the presence of other transmitting nodes. This process can be performed either locally by a single cognitive system or collectively through a network of many [21] . In the case of a narrow-band transmission, such as the FM transmitter shown in Figure 9a , a cognitive radio avoids utilizing the occupied band. Using the previously described demodulation method, the system generates a key identical to the previous, minus the bits from the occupied band.
However, in the presence of a low-power, broadband jammer, a cognitive radio can not avoid transmitting in the same band (Figure 9b ). Because the jammer is closer to node A than node B, the received power from the jammer is different at each node. Depending on the method of measuring the channel, either the signal-to-noise ratio or the total measured power at a given frequency will differ. Regardless, channel symmetry is broken and the generation of a symmetric key becomes difficult.
Assuming the system is able to iteratively simplify the constellation in response to failed attempts to create matching keys, the simplest constellation, a binary magnitude-threshold constellation which omits phase, as shown in Figure 10a , will be converged upon. Figure 10b shows the path of the vectors over the constellation in frequency, with the location of the sample points marked. If the channel were symmetric, the two paths would be identical.
There are 80 sample points for the single path, generating 80 b in a single time step. The bits generated by node A are as follows:
11111111 11111111 11100000 00000000 00000000 00000010 11111111 11111111 11110001 00010000
The bits generated by node B are as follows:
11111111 11111111 11000000 00000000 00000000 00000110 01111111 11111111 11100011 00000000
There are six disagreements and both keys fail a runs test.
It is shown here that a low-power, broadband jammer located in close proximity to a single node is capable of breaking receiver symmetry and preventing the creation of a shared cryptographic key. A possible solution is the measurement and exchange of noise floors between nodes, however, while restoring symmetry, dynamic range would still be limited.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Methods to generate private keys based on wireless channel characteristics have been proposed as an alternative to standard key-management schemes. In this paper, we present a generalized scheme for the creation of private keys using uncorrelated channels in multiple domains. Proposed cognitive enhancements measure channel characteristics, to dynamically change transmission and reception parameters as well as estimate private key randomness and expiration time. We evaluate a proof-of-concept implementation of this system with and without interferers in software using a channel model that provides variation in multiple domains.
